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A team of operators is required for nuclear power plant operation, and communication between the
operators is an important aspect of the team's ability to successfully carry out tasks. It has been difficult
to evaluate the quality of this communication though, and as the relationship between communication
quality and team performance has yet to be clarified, it has not been applied to most human reliability
analysis (HRA) methodologies. This study investigates the relationship between the quality of commu-
nication and team performance using data from a full-scope training simulator of a digital main control
room (MCR). Two important characteristics of communication were considered to determine quality:
each operator's ability to self-confirm the status of a given task in a digital MCR, and the type of
communication, as divided into 1-way, 2-way, and 3-way between operators. To measure team perfor-
mance, the concept of an unsafe act was employed, which is defined as a human error that has the
potential to negatively affect plant safety. Analysis results showed that the communication quality and
team performance were related to each other. With this more clearly defined relationship, the results of
this study can be applied to related performance shaping factors to improve HRA.
© 2019 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is commonly used to
determine the level of safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs), with
PSA-based risk information employed in regulation, operation, and
management. Through PSA, NPPs must satisfy a quantitative safety
value for core damage frequency, and one of the dominant con-
tributors to this critical factor is human error. To quantitatively and
qualitatively evaluate human error, human reliability analysis
(HRA) has been adopted, which assesses the performance of op-
erators as part of PSA [1]. There are various HRAmethods to analyze
human error, including THERP, HEART, and CREAM [2e4]. Accord-
ing to the particular method, human error probability (HEP) is
obtained through various performance shaping factors (PSFs),
which are related to the various conditions in the environment in
which operators perform their tasks. As PSFs affect the tasks of the
operators, and therefore HEP, they are the subject of ongoing
research [5].by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is anReducing human error often derives from supporting an indi-
vidual's ability to improve their performance. However, NPPs are
too complex to be managed by one such individual, and as a result,
operation is controlled by a team composed of various members.
The performance of this operation team is influenced by various
factors, one of which is the communication between the operators.
Especially in an emergency situation, smooth communication
among operators is an essential factor for proper accident man-
agement [6,7]. Beyond the nuclear industry, communication
research has been conducted in a variety of fields. For example,
more than 70% of the 28,000 reports submitted to the NASA Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System over five years from 1976 to 1981
involved communication problems between pilots and air traffic
controllers [8]; likewise, in the rail industry, most accidents
involving rail repair and maintenance resulted from communica-
tion problems [9]. One study analyzed the relationship between
communication and team performance for air defense teams [10].
As indicated by these studies, the impact of communication quality
on team performance should be better explored with the goal to
reduce human error.
Despite the importance of communication, as shown in Table 1,open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
Table 1
Summary of PSFs according to HRA method [13].
CREAM STAHR HRMS INTENT
Adequacy of organization Quality of information: Time HMIb
Working conditions eDesign Quality of information/interface Stress
Adequacy of MMIa and operational support eMeaningfulness of procedures Training/Expertise/Experience/Competence
Availability of procedures/plans Organization: Procedures Experience
Number of simultaneous goals eRole of operations Task organization Safety culture
Available time eTeams Task complexity Training
Time of day Personal: Motivation




SLIM ATHEANA INCORECT Taylor-Adams’
Quality of design Plant conditions Time availability Alarms
Meaningfulness of procedures Procedures Plan availability and accessibility Communication
Role of operations Training Information availability and accessibility Ergonomic design
Teams Communication Simultaneous tasks HMIb ambiguous
Stress Supervision Decision-making criteria HMIb feedback
Morale/Motivator Staffing Response dynamics and system coupling Labels
Competence Humanesystem interface Supervision Lack of supervision/checks
PLG-SLIM Organizational factors Capability degrading factors Procedures
Plant interface and indications of conditions Stress Teamwork and social factors Refresher training
Significant preceding and concurrent actions Environmental conditions Organizational factors Stress
Task complexity Task complexity
Procedural guidance Task criticality
Training and experience Task novelty
Adequacy of time to accomplish action Time pressure
Stress Training
Other Workload
a MMI: manemachine interface.
b HMI: humanemachine interface.
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methods used in NPPs include communication as a PSF, commu-
nication is not considered in the more commonly used methods
THERP, HEART, and CREAM [13]. Through the current study, the
relationship between communication quality and team perfor-
mance is investigated. Applying the results to PSFs may provide
more reliable HEP to improve HRA accuracy.2. Definition of communication methods
In Korean NPPs, the operation team consists of five members
who work to achieve safe operation from the main control room
(MCR). They are the shift supervisor (SS), reactor operator (RO),
turbine operator (TO), electrical operator (EO), and shift technical
advisor (STA). The RO, TO, and EO are also referred to as board
operators (BOs). In an emergency situation, the operators follow a
procedure called the emergency operation procedure (EOP) to
mitigate the accident consequences and prevent the leakage of
radioactive materials. The EOP, provided in the form of a series of
steps, describes guidelines for the equipment and systems that
require operation to restore safety-critical functions [14]. During
emergency operation, the SS looks at the procedure and asks the
related BO for the current plant status. Also, the SS instructs the BO
to carry out the required action. As such, communication led by the
SS is critical. Especially in emergency situations, the steps of the
EOP are performed in sequence with the decisions required by all
steps depending on the SS. Further, the beginning of most team
communication is initiated by the SS, and the BOs accordingly
respond to the direction and needs of the SS. Such communication
occurs between the operators in order to complete the tasks of the
procedural steps to stabilize the NPP.
The specific types of communication in the MCR can be divided
into 8 main categoriesdCall, Inquiry, Command, Suggestion,Observation, Judgment, Announcement, and Acknowledgementdand
18 subcategories [15], all of which are arranged in Table 2.
The situation of the plant is recognized and shared among op-
erators mainly through the Observation, Suggestion, Judgment, and
Announcement communication types. Specific actions are consid-
ered and decided upon among operators by the Inquiry and Reply
types, and performance of the procedural tasks is conducted via the
Inquiry and Command types. In this study, communication is
analyzed based on the performance of a procedure; as all proce-
dural steps are performed using Command and Inquiry, other
communication types such as Observation, Suggestion, and Judg-
ment apply to the performance of additional tasks. As a result, the
communication types of Inquiry and Command are the main focus
of the present analysis.
Different forms of communication are involved with all
communication types. Fig. 1 shows three forms between the MCR
operators; here,1-way communication refers to a single statement
by the SS with no reply from the BO, 2-way refers to a BO reply to
the initial SS statement, and 3-way refers to further acknowl-
edgement and confirmation of the BO's reply by the SS. In an
emergency situation, 3-way communication is recommended to
decrease human error. In this manner, this work defines commu-
nication quality depending on its form, with 3-way considered
high-quality communication as compared with 1- and 2-way.
As also pictured in Fig. 1, there is a new characteristic of digital
MCRs as compared to conventional analog MCRs, which is the
ability of the SS to individually verify the status of the plant through
such digital equipment as the computerized procedure system
(CPS), large display panel (LDP), and the information flat-panel
display. This verification is called “self-confirmation” and allows
the SS to perform procedural tasks by observing the variables alone,
thus affecting MCR communication.
Table 2
Communication type and definition [15].
Category Subcategory Definition Example
CALL Call Call to a specific person for communication “RO”
Response Respond to the Call. “This is the RO speaking”
Call-Identification Caller responds to the receiver's self-identification “This is the EO”
Call-Id-Acknowledgement Receiver responds to the caller's self-identification “OK”
INQUIRY Inquiry State a question “Is the vacuum valve open?”
Reply Answer the question “Yes, the vacuum valve is open.”
Reply-Ack State that the reply was received “OK”
COMMAND Command Specifically order an action to manipulate an object “Close valve V20200
Command-Ack State that the command was received “OK. I'll close valve V20200
Command-Confirm Confirm that the command was successfully received “OK”
SUGGESTION Suggestion State a recommendation for a specific action or an
introduction of an idea for consideration
“Should we try to start the charging pump?”
OBSERVATION Observation State a description of plant or equipment status “The water level of the steam generator is increasing.”
Observation-Ack State that the observation was received “OK”
JUDGMENT Judgment Express a judgment of the situation “Trouble is occurring because of low pressure of the
vacuum pump.”
Judgment-Ack State that the judgment was received “OK”
ANNOUNCEMENT Announcement State information about something that happened
or that will happen to the plant workers
“Attention please. EDG B will be started due to a
scheduled maintenance. Three, two, one, go”
Announcement-Ack State that the announcement was received “OK”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Acknowledgement State that any message was received “OK”
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3.1. Scenario and data collection
The emergency situation chosen for analysis was a steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident. In the event of SGTR, there
is a risk of radiation leakage due to the fracture of a steam gener-
ator, and the core, as the most important part of the NPP, can be
damaged. Operators follow the relevant EOP to minimize any
leakage of radioactive material from the steam generator(s) and
also to cool the core using a cooling system [16].
To collect data, there are three major HRA data sources. The first
is various types of accident reports reflecting actual operating
experience, the second is experimental data using a full-scope or
compact scope training simulator, and the third is crew or expert
interviews [17].
The current study was performed using data from a full-scope
training simulator of the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe
(APR1400), which is a Korean-type pressurized water reactor. The
MCR of this NPP is equipped with digital technology. Digitalized
MCRs are typically designed to incorporate LDPs, soft controls (SCs),
computer displays, touchscreens, and computerized operator sup-
port systems like an advanced alarm system and a CPS [18]. The
MCR environment of the APR1400 therefore differs from conven-
tional MCRs, and various studies are currently underway to analyze
the effects of the digital features [19].
During emergency situation training, the behavior and
communication quality of the operators were analyzed usingFig. 1. Communication forms in digital MCRs.microphones and video recordings. Communication quality and
team performance were analyzed using the accident simulation
data from a total of nine different operator teams. Among the
various PSFs (Table 1), this study considered the following common
factors: operating experience of the SS, average operating experi-
ence of the team, digital MCR familiarity of the SS, average digital
MCR familiarity of the team, stress, training experience, MMI
quality, and procedure quality. The latter four were similar among
all teams: the accident training scenario is an emergency situation
such that each team had a high level of stress, all teams had prior
training experience in the SGTR scenario, and the same MMI and
CPSwere used. The other four PSFs varied between teams, as shown
in Table 3.3.2. Analysis method
In order to evaluate team performance, it is necessary to analyze
all human errors that occur during the performance of the task.
First, the concept of human error should be established. In some
cases, the operator intentionally does not perform the task as
required by the procedure; such intentional procedural non-
compliance was observed in the simulation data of this study. In
this case, it was difficult to conclude whether or not the action
should be regarded as human error, because some non-
compliances resulted in a safer plant condition. Experienced op-
erators often tend tomodify procedures, such as attempting to omit
repetitive tasks or changing the order of tasks presented in theTable 3














Team 1 25 8.6 6 4.6
Team 2 29 12.8 5 4.5
Team 3 20 9.3 5 4.9
Team 4 32 10.8 7 5.6
Team 5 20 6.5 0 1.3
Team 6 25 10.2 2 2.4
Team 7 30 10.8 2 2.2
Team 8 30 9.1 2.8 4.5
Team 9 20 11.8 5 5.8
Table 4




1-1(1) Verify that the reactor power is
decreasing
Self-confirmation X
1-1(2) Check whether the startup rate
is negative
3-way X
1-1(3) Check that the control rods are
fully inserted
2-way O
1-1(3)-RNO Boric acid is injected into the
reactor coolant system (RCS) to
ensure shutdown margin
e e
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immediately isolated the steam generator upon obtaining infor-
mation about the rupture, regardless of the order of the procedure.
Therefore, rather than using the procedural steps to determine
team performance, this study focused on unsafe act (UAs), which
are defined as human error that has the potential to negatively
affect NPP safety [21e23]. Operator behavior in terms of UAs was
thus observed and analyzed from the simulator data.
Table 4 shows an example of the analysis process. Operators
perform a given task in the accident scenario step by step, and the
communication quality during the task is monitored with UAs
determined. As a first example, the conversation and behavior of
operators in the ‘Check whether the startup rate is negative’ task
(Step 1-1 (2)) were analyzed. The SS asked the RO: “RO, is the
startup rate negative?” The RO replied to the SS: “Yes, it is negative.”
The SS then confirmed the answer: “OK. It is negative.” In this case,
the communication form was 3-way, and a UA did not occur
because the startup rate was negative and the RO executed the
proper action. As a second example, the conversation and behavior
of operators to perform the ‘Check that the control rod is fully
inserted’ task (Step 1-1 (3)) was analyzed as follows. The SS asked
the RO: “Are the control rods fully inserted?” The RO replied to the
SS: “Yes.” The conversation finished at this point, but the actual
situation reflected that three control rods were not fully inserted.
Thus, the RO reported the wrong information to the SS, who did not
confirm the task. As a result, operators were not able to conduct the
’Boric acid is injected into the reactor coolant system (RCS) toFig. 2. Team performance byensure shutdown margin’ task that they had to perform. In this
case, the communication quality was 2-way, and a UA occurred. All
tasks were analyzed accordingly.4. Communication quality effect analysis
This study analyzed team performance and communication
quality in a digital MCR. Video was analyzed of the SGTR scenario
using full-scope simulation data from nine teams comprising SS,
RO, TO, EO, and STA members. The concept of UAwas applied as an
evaluation factor of team performance; that is, teams with high
performance committed fewer UAs during the emergency situa-
tion. Team performance was evaluated by dividing the number of
UAs by the number of procedural steps; it should be noted that as
the number of procedural steps increase, the possibility of UAs
increases. The communication forms were 1-way, 2-way, and -way,
with the additional self-confirmation ability of the SS to check the
steps in a digital MCR. High levels of communication quality were
considered to include mostly 3-way communication.
In addition to communication quality, this study also analyzed
other PSFs. Figs. 2 and 3 show the analysis results of team perfor-
mance according to the operating experience of the SS and of the
team, respectively. Since the SSs of all teams had more than 20
years of experience, SS operating experience did not affect team
performance in this study; likewise, with no clear trend, team
operating experience also had no effect on team performance.
Additionally, the digital MCR experience PSF was also analyzed.
As shown in Figs. 4 and 5, there was no relationship between this
PSF and team performance, and thus it can be said that digital MCR
experience, like operating experience, did not affect team perfor-
mance in this study. With these results, and the fact that the
remaining PSFs, namely stress, training experience, and procedure
quality, were the same for all teams as discussed previously, the
analysis results focusing on communication quality are believed to
be more meaningful.
Fig. 6 shows the ratios of 1-way, 2-way, and 3-way communi-
cation along with self-confirmation. The two largest proportions
were 2-way and self-confirmation at 55% and 23%, respectively. In
the emergency situation, the operators tried to deal with the ac-
cident by quickly going through the procedure, which was facili-
tated by 2-way communication and self-confirmation as fasterSS operating experience.
Fig. 3. Team performance by team average operating experience.
H. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 52 (2020) 1180e11871184forms than 3-way communication. Thus, following the tendency of
the teams for quick procedural execution, 3-way communication
was observed less frequently, at 18%. The lowest proportion was 1-
way communication, which at 4% was only observed during
changes between procedures.
Fig. 7 illustrates the relationship between communication
quality and team performance. In this study, the higher the 3-way
communication ratio, the higher the communication quality,
which, as shown in Fig. 7, affected team performance. As team
performance is based on the number of UAs per number of pro-
cedural steps, team performance was considered high when the
number of UAs per steps was low. Taken together, higher
communication quality led to higher team performance.
Fig. 8 depicts the ratio of communication forms in the tasks in
which UAs occurred. Results of the analysis excluded the UA cases
of procedural omissions and BO operational errors that were notFig. 4. Team performance by Srelated to communication. Here, the ratio of 3-way communication
is the smallest. This supports the finding that active 3-way
communication improves team performance.5. Discussion and conclusion
Nuclear power plants are operated by teams rather than by in-
dividuals, and therefore communication between operators is
essential. This study analyzed the impact of communication quality
on team performance. Data recorded from an emergency training
situation were utilized for a total of nine teams in a digital MCR. In
an emergency situation, the SS directs the other operators using the
relevant procedures to deal with the accident; this study classified
three forms of communication between the team, with 3-way
determined to indicate high-quality communication. Team perfor-
mance was evaluated via the number of UAs.S digital MCR experience.
Fig. 5. Team performance by team average digital MCR experience.
Fig. 6. Ratio of communication forms.
Fig. 7. Team performance by communication quality.
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Fig. 8. Communication form observed during UA occurrence.
H. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 52 (2020) 1180e11871186The following issues from this study should be addressed.
✓ Habitual responses, such as a simple acknowledgement without
actual confirmation, are reflected in the analyzed 3-way
communication cases. For example, although one SS checked
the plant state via 3-way communication, a UA still occurred,
possibly because the 3-way communication was a simple
habitual response rather than an actual confirmation. Further
analysis is needed to clarify such habitual 3-way
communication.
✓ This study analyzed only the SGTR scenario; more scenarios and
data analysis will lead to more reliable results.
✓ The digital MCR environment, in terms of information sharing
and manipulation, differs from analog MCRs. As this study
focused on the digital environment, comparative analyses with
communication studies in analog MCRs are necessary, as
numerous NPPs with analogMCRs are still in operation and thus
could benefit from improved HRA.
✓ Operations teams recovered most of the UAs by repeating
particular procedural steps or by operators recognizing the er-
rors and recovering them. However, recovery was not consid-
ered in this study.
The communication quality results as found in this study are
believed to be reliable, as the other PSFs considered here, such as
operating experience, did not affect team performance. Notably,
one factor though that seemed to affect communication quality was
the speed of the team in conducting their tasks. To perform the
procedure quickly, 2-way communication and self-confirmation
occupied the largest proportion of communication. While it is
important for the team to promptly perform procedures, accuracy
is more important. Thus, operators need to increase the ratio of 3-
way communication to improve team performance, as indicated by
Fig. 8, which shows that UAs hardly occur with 3-way communi-
cation. In addition, this figure suggests the vulnerability of the self-
confirmation characteristic, with its high percentage of UAs. Most
HRA methodologies do not have a weighting factor based on
communication quality when deriving HEP; through this study, it
was found that communication quality affects team performance,
thereby indicating that a weighting factor for communicationquality is needed when deriving HEP to ultimately improve HRA.
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